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Abstract
Underlying any theory of physics is a layer of conceptual frames.
They connect the mathematical structures used in theoretical models
with physical phenomena, but they also constitute our fundamental
assumptions about reality. Many of the discrepancies between quan-
tum physics and classical physics (including Maxwell’s electrodynam-
ics and relativity) can be traced back to these categorical foundations.
We argue that classical physics corresponds to the factual aspects of
reality and requires a categorical framework which consists of four in-
terdependent components: boolean logic, the linear-sequential notion
of time, the principle of sufficient reason, and the dichotomy between
observer and observed. None of these can be dropped without affect-
ing the others.
However, in quantum theory the reduction postulate also addresses
the “status nascendi” of facts, i.e., their coming into being. There-
fore, quantum phyics requires a different conceptual framework which
will be elaborated in this article. It is shown that many of its com-
ponents are already present in the standard formalisms of quantum
physics, but in most cases they are highlighted not so much from a
conceptual perspective but more from their mathematical structures.
The categorical frame underlying quantum physics includes a pro-
foundly different notion of time which encompasses a crucial role for
the present.
1 Introduction
Even today, many scientists and philosophers of science still struggle with
the fundamental concepts of quantum theory. It is not the mathematical
formalism which is at the center of this struggle - apart from technical details
the formalism is relatively simple - but it is more the conceptual questions
and the physical intuition related to this mathematical framework which is
unsatisfactory. It has often been argued that our ways of thinking rely on our
every-day experiences, and, therefore, may not fit to the realm of microscopic
systems. But on the other hand, we have far less problems dealing with
geometry in 26 dimensions or with the topology of infinite dimensional spaces.
It is not so much a lack of imagination and visualization which is at the heart
of the problems, but rather an apparent contradiction of certain aspects of
quantum theory with our most basic assumptions about reality.
What are some of these aspects of quantum theory which scientists strug-
gle with? Surely, one aspect is related to the intrinsic indeterminacy of
quantum theory. We are used to indeterminacy in every-day situations, but
whenever we refer to probability theory, we consider this indeterminacy as
a lack of knowledge. In some way or another we are reluctant to give up
Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason which states that “nothing takes place
without a sufficient reason; in other words, that nothing occurs for which it
would be impossible for someone who has enough knowledge of things to give
a reason adequate to determine why the thing is as it is and not otherwise.”[1]
This principle seems to be violated in quantum theory, at least in those in-
terpretations which include the reduction postulate. The violation of Bell’s
inequalities [2] in quantum physics [3] seems to indicate that in some cases
even the mere assumption of a predeterminded cause for the behavior of
quantum systems (e.g., the observed deviation of an atom in a Stern-Gerlach
set-up) leads to contradictions.
Another conundrum of quantum theory is related to its non-locality, in
particular in the context of EPR-scenarios [4], i.e., in cases which involve
entangled states. Quantum states can be highly non-local, but local mea-
surements can lead to an instantaneous reduction of the whole state. Two
fundamental concepts seem to contradict each other: the locality principle
of relativity and the reduction postulate of quantum theory. In addition to
its non-local aspects, entanglement expresses a type of relationship which is
unknown in classical physics. The concept of facticity is put into question
when entangled states are involved. Rovelli in his relational interpretation
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of quantum theory describes this situation as: “... a physical fact, its being
true, or not true, must be understood as relative to an observer...” [5].
Still another weird aspect of quantum theory are “superpositions”. Even
though superpositions only refer to vector representations of quantum states,
there is a more general phenomenon behind it: In quantum theory there
are no states which are non-dispersive with respect to all observables. This
statement is trivial for mixed states, but it also refers to pure states. In other
words, for any state there exist observables such that repeated measurements
of the same observable on systems prepared in this same state do not always
yield the same results. Again, the formalism does not allow to attribute
this fact to an imperfect preparation of the state (which is not separated
with respect to certain “hidden” variables), but it is something intrinsic to
quantum states.
As a final aspect we mention the lack of a rigid spatiotemporal ordering
of events. Events do not happen at a particular location in space and at
a particular moment in time. The spatial “smearing out” of particles as
expressed by wave functions is well known and partially related to the non-
boolean aspect of quantum theory: a particle is not “either” in a certain
volume element “or” not, but according to the extension of the wave function
it can be to a certain degree inside a volume element “as well as” outside this
element. Usually less emphasized is the temporal aspect of this phenomenon:
a lack of sequentiality of events. This partial loss of a sequential time will be
one of the major subjects of this article.
Various interpretations of quantum theory have addressed the problems
mentioned above. Physicists favouring a more formal or positivistic approach
may deny any conceptual problems of quantum theory because the mathe-
matical concepts are well defined and free of contradictions, and the associ-
ations of mathematical structures with physical observables are equally well
defined and in full agreement with all experiments. Protagonists of the many-
world interpretation [6, 7] may deny a problem with the non-locality of the
reduction process or with indeterminacy, because in the many-world inter-
pretation there is no reduction. Supporters of a subjective or an information
based interpretation of quantum states see no problem in the reduction pro-
cess, because according to their understanding, reduction is merely a change
of knowledge about a system. Still, for many physicists the alternatives of-
fered by these interpretations are unacceptable for reasons of their own.
Two major assumptions about quantum theory will be made in this arti-
cle: (1) the quantum state of a system is related to an ontic element of reality
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(thus excluding purely information based and subjective interpretations of
a quantum state), and (2) the reduction process too is related to an ontic
element of reality (hence, we will mention but not focus onto the implica-
tions which the many-world interpretation has for the applicability of our
approach). Furthermore, we will also not discuss explicit alterations of the
standard formalism of quantum theory, like the the approaches of Karolyhazy
[8] and Penrose [9], which attribute the reduction process to an influence of
gravity, or the GRW formalism [10] and relativistic extensions [11], which
add to the Schro¨dinger equation a non-linear stochastic term. In these cases
the reduction of the wave function is attributed to reduction centers. We
will also not discuss interpretations which invole a causation into the past
(like, e.g., in [12]) or which are “superdeterministic” by including the future
decisions of experimenters about which experiment to make into the initial
conditions of quantum systems (like, e.g., the approach of Palmer [13]). The
reason why we will not elaborate our conceptual framework in the context of
these approaches is not so much that our framework is not applicable, but
rather that it would require a refinement and adaptation for each single case
which would go far beyond the scope of a single article.
Our approach to the counterintuitive aspects of quantum theory is less
formal and more conceptual. First, we want to analyse, which “hidden as-
sumptions” we often make when we try to interprete quantum mechanical
issues and why this hidden assumptions in the context of quantum theory
seem to lead to contradictions with our understanding of how reality “should
be”. These hidden assumptions are no surprises: We are aware that, e.g., we
tend to apply causality in the sense of Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason,
or that we apply boolean (“either-or”) logic to physical attributes like loca-
tion, energy, and momentum, or that we like to put ourselves into an external
perspective (in contrast to the “participatory universe” of Wheeler[14]). We
apply these assumptions successfully in the context of classical physics, and
we know that they lead to contradictions with quantum theory, but we often
do not see the conceptual alternatives. Therefore, as a second step, we will
suggest a replacement of these concepts which work so well in the context
of classical physics. This replacement will not be on the formal mathemat-
ical level - such concepts exist, e.g., the axiomatic algebraic approach [15]
or the notion of non-boolean lattices [16] - but rather on the level of con-
ceptual thinking. Therefore, our approach does not aim at a replacement of
the existing mathematical formalism, but instead it elaborates the underly-
ing categorical assumptions thus allowing for a coherent interpretation. The
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purpose of this article could in a way be summarized as: Making quantum
physics thinkable.
One might ask whether such a non-mathematical conceptual foundation
is necessary or what the advantages might be of having such a categorical
framework at hand. We will address this question in the next section (Sec.
2) but a brief answer will be that the difficulties we have in formulating
a consistent and satisfactory unification of general relativity and quantum
theory might indicate that some of the basic notions we use in the context
of these two theories are incompatible and not yet fully understood. For this
reason it not only seems legitimate but necessary to rethink the conceptual
underpinnings in these theories.
In Sec. 3 we will address the issue that quantum theory mainly deals
with the “coming into being” of reality, while classical Newtonian physics is
more about the factual aspect of reality. In our opinion, this is the major
difference between classical physics and quantum theory, and it is this dif-
ference which makes a richer conceptual framework necessary for quantum
theory. In Sec. 4 we introduce the notions of a category, a categorical slot, a
categorical apparatus and a categorical framework in the more philosophical
meaning which we will use in this article. After these preliminary notions we
will describe in Sec. 5 the categorical assumptions we make in the context of
classical, factual physics. In Sec. 6 we will introduce the categorical appara-
tus necessary to address questions related to “reality in the making”, i.e. the
categorical apparatus of quantum theory. Both apparatus taken together,
the categorical apparatus related to factual classical physics and the cate-
gorical apparatus related to quantum theory, make up the whole categorical
framework necessary to address reality as such.
One category in the apparatus related to quantum theory - the non-
sequential “time-space of the present” - is of particular importance. We will
argue that certain ingredients in the formalism of quantum theory indicate
that for a full understanding we may need a theory of the present. In contrast
to the other categories which are well-known from the standard formulation
of quantum theory, this aspect is usually less emphasized in the standard
presentations of quantum theory. Therefore, we will devote Sec. 7 to this
concept. A brief summary as well as an outlook to other applications of
our scheme will conclude this article. Because of the unfamiliar approach
taken in this article, we will describe some of the physical aspects and their
relation to the philosophical concepts in more detail than would otherwise
be necessary.
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2 Why a categorical framework?
Before we introduce the categorical framework which in our opinition is most
appropriate for dealing with classical and quantum physics, and “reality”
in general, we want to justify why it might be necessary to develope such
categories or concepts and to clarify the relations among these concepts. Why
is it not sufficient to refer exclusively to the mathematical formalism which
allows to make predictions for the outcomes of future experiments?
A famous answer to this question is known from Einstein: It has often
been said, and certainly not without justification, that the man of science is a
poor philosopher. Why then should it not be the right thing for the physicist
to let the philosopher do the philosophizing? Such might indeed be the right
thing to do at a time when the physicist believes he has at his disposal a
rigid system of fundamental concepts and fundamental laws which are so
well established that waves of doubt can’t reach them; but it cannot be right
at a time when the very foundations of physics itself have become problematic
as they are now. At a time like the present, when experience forces us to seek
a newer and more solid foundation, the physicist cannot simply surrender to
the philosopher the critical contemplation of theoretical foundations; for he
himself knows best and feels more surely where the shoe pinches. In looking
for a new foundation, he must try to make clear in his own mind just how
far the concepts which he uses are justified, and are necessities.[17]
A present day example for this necessity can be found in the efforts to
find a conceptually satisfying unification of general relativity and quantum
theory. One approach to such a unification is to apply and extend the ex-
isting mathematical formalism to new areas and to hope that the results
are still meaningful. This is done in the context of canonical quantization,
loop quantum gravity, Wheeler-DeWitt type of approaches or even string
theory. Another direction to go is to reconsider the fundamental concepts
- space, time, matter, reality etc. - of the existing theories and to clarify
the exact meaning in which these concepts are used, why these attributed
meanings may be incompatible with each other, and by what concepts we
might sensibly replace them. An attempt of this kind is made in this article.
Another reason to analyse the fundamental concepts from a more general
perspective and, in particular, to relate them to ideas which are not from
mathematical textbooks (later we will use expressions like “autogenesis”,
“parataxis”, “self-referentiality”, etc.) is that these concepts actually do
occur outside the realm of quantum physics, for instance in the areas of
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consciousness and selfhood or of literature and art. In these areas we are
used to expressions which often refer to a vague feeling or an impression and
which lack mathematical rigor. Nevertheless, we often use these concepts
with considerable success in the development of ideas and the establishment
of relations which we would miss without these concepts. In quantum theory
we are in the lucky situation, that we have a rigorous mathematical formalism
which we can use in making exact statements or predictions, and which we
can also use in making the vague concepts mentioned above more rigorous.
What we often lack is the intuitive notion which helps us to develop new ideas.
Therefore, our aim is on the one hand to keep the rigorous mathematical
formalism for deducing precise conclusions, and, on the other hand, to enlarge
this tool by a more intuitive but, nevertheless, equally rich framework of
categories which, when being aware of them, can be used to get a deeper
understanding of quantum physics and, more general, of reality.
3 Quantum physics - the “status nascendi”
of reality
Why does quantum theory need a different set of categories as compared
to the classical physical theories like Newtonian mechanics, Maxwells’s field
theory, or even special and general relativity? Why are already the basic
questions addressed by quantum theory of a fundamentally different nature?
We argue, and this will be elaborated in more detail in this section, that
quantum theory is a theory about how facts come into being, how facts “are
born”, i.e. the “status nascendi” of reality. In contrast, classical physics deals
with facts, not the coming into being of facts. This fundamental difference
requires the different categories which we will introduce in the next sections.
In classical physics we mainly talk about facts. By facts we usually mean
configurations or constellations of objects which we see (or otherwise detect).
From these configurations we can deduce that certain events have happened.
Even if we talk about “events” in the context of classical physics, we usually
refer to the facts which evolved from these events. In this sense we will use
the word “fact” to denote the traces which events have left behind in the
constellation of our present reality. An obvious example for such a trace
is a fotograph which shows us a picture of a situation in the past. Similar
examples are fossiles or written documents. Less obvious but of a similar
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kind are the traces left behind in our brain which allow us to remember
certain situations. Another example are scattered particles whose momentum
or energy carry information about the scattering event. Only what leaves
factual traces qualifies for the notion of a “real event”.
Even in cases where we seem to observe a certain event, what we perceive
and observe are already traces: the photons which have been scattered by
objects which took part in an event or the sound waves which have been
emitted by a clash of certain objects. Even when we refer to the event of
observation itself, by the moment we become aware of this event we are
already talking about facts. The closest we come to taking part in an event
itself is the phenomenon of becoming aware of something. However, now
the problem of consciuosness enters and we are leaving the realm of known
physics. (In [18] we elaborated on the similarity between the conceptual
frameworks of quantum theory and consciousness.)
The deterministic nature of classical physics leaves no room for possibili-
ties or alternatives apart from the epistemic uncertainty which arises because
of our lack of knowledge about certain situations. In principle, the present
state already determines the future states in a similar way as from the present
state one can deduce the past. In the realm of classical physics it is the second
law of thermodynamics (the increase of entropy in non-equilibrium systems)
which makes it easier for us to deduce events in the past from facts in the
present as compared to predicting events in the future from the present sit-
uation.
In contrast, quantum theory refers to the transition from possibilities (or
potentialities) to facts. A wave function, or, more general, a quantum state,
carries information about the past of the system, but with respect to possible
events in the future it only allows to make probabilistic predictions. In
quantum theory, this probabilistic nature is intrinsic, not a lack of knowledge
about the present state. The transition from this “sum of possibilities” to
a single factual result is what we define as the “event”, and in this sense
quantum theory addresses the coming into being - or the “status nascendi”
- of facts.
At this stage some remarks about our notion of “event” are in order.
Whenever we are referring to non-quantum physics, the expression “event”
is used in the same sense as it is used, e.g., in the context of special or
general relativity: Events are the nodes of the gist of space-time. In most
cases, they are idealized to be “point-like”. Events can be a conglumerat of
more elementary events and in many cases we even assume that there are
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“basic” events which cannot be separated into subevents anymore.
When we talk about events in the context of quantum theory we should,
strictly speaking, distinguish two types of events. One type of event refers to
the transition from possibilities to facts in the reduction process. When there
is a danger of confusion, we will use the expression “transgressive event”,
emphasizing the transitional aspect of “becoming a fact”. An attempt to give
a more precise meaning to this type of event can be found in [19]. A second
type of event will be what in discussions about quantum theory sometimes is
called “virtual event”. These type of events often refer to an interpretation
of aspects of the formalism (e.g., the terms in a perturbative expansion, like
the emission of a photon by an electron in a scattering process). They do
not lead to facts individually, but only as parts of a transgressive event.
4 A categorical framework
In this section we will introduce the notion of a catgeorical apparatus and
a categorical framework. Loosely speaking, a categorical apparatus consists
of a set of categories which are mutually interdependent, and a categorical
framework consists of two (or more) categorical apparatus which, taken as a
whole, allow to formulate any meaningful statement with respect to the realm
addressed by the categories. The notions of “category” and “categorical” are
not used in a mathematical but a philosophical sense.
The notion of a category has a long history in philosophy, and different
thinkers have often attributed different meanings to this notion. Fortunately,
we will not need a rigorous definition but only the general idea (actually, in
the context of the approach developed here, a comprehensively well-defined
notion of “category” may not even be possible). Categories are the most fun-
damental interface between reality and cognition. They constitute primordial
assumptions about the nature of phenomena. For instance, the assumption
that all physical processes are deterministic and can be described by an
equation of motion is a categorical assumption which holds in Newtonian
physics but not in quantum physics. As we shall see, however, categories do
not come as isolated entities, but they are mutually interrelated. For such
a set of interdependent categories we introduce the notion of a categorical
apparatus.
The general structure of a categorical apparatus consists of various slots
that are to be filled with specific, interrelated categories. This means that
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categories which we insert into a certain slot have consequences with respect
to the other categories. These interdependencies of categories are so rigid,
that one category predetermines the other categories, and any attempt to
substitute a given category by a different assumption leads to inconsistencies
with the other categories. The slots within a categorical apparatus will be
called a categorical template.
To make the idea more crisp let us give an example which we will study in
more detail in Sect. 5: the categorical apparatus of classical (non-quantum)
physics, by which we mean Newtonian mechanics, Maxwell’s field theory
and relativity. We argue that the following four slots make up a categorical
template (for a more philosophical account of this structure see [20, 21, 22]):
1. What is the relation between physical events?
2. How can we combine predications about physical observables?
3. What is the relation between the observer and the observed?
4. Which ordering structures are attributed to space and time?
Underlying classical physics are the following four categorical assumptions:
1. The events which make up physical processes are causally deterministic.
2. For all physical attributes the tertium on datur holds, i.e., in a given
context only one of the predicates, “a” or “not a”, can be true.
3. The observer can be considered as separated from the observed and the
acquisition of information is possible without influencing the observed
system.
4. At each instant in time, the location of physical bodies is determined by
their relative distances. Along any world-line, events are sequentially
ordered.
It seems obvious that if we change one of the categories, e.g., the sequentiality
of time (“for any two events a and b along a world-line either a < b or b < a
holds”) this has a huge impact on the other categories. E.g., the standard
notions of causality or determinism can no longer hold if this assumption is
dropped.
10
We claim that all physical theories imply certain underlying categorical
assumptions. This refers only partially to the mathematical formalism per se
but more to its association with physical phenomena. It will turn out, how-
ever, that not all questions related to reality can be formulated meaningfully
within only one categorical apparatus, e.g., the frame defined by the classi-
cal categorical apparatus given above. Quantum physics requires a different
categorical apparatus. None of the four classical categories holds in quan-
tum physics, i.e., all categories have to be changed. For this reason, attemps
which try to cope with quantum theory by relaxing only one of the cate-
gories listed above are bound to fail. The categorical apparatus given above
will be applicable whenever we make statements about the factual aspect of
reality, therefore we will refer to it as the F-scheme. On the other hand,
quantum theory also deals with the “coming into being” of facts. Whenever
we address the “statu nascendi” aspect of reality, i.e., make “event-related”
statements, the second categorical apparatus, the so-called E-scheme will be
needed. Both apparatus together, the F-scheme and the E-scheme, constitute
the complete categorical framework that allows to address physical reality in
a comprehensive way.
5 The categorical apparatus of factual reality
As we have mentioned before, facts are traces left behind by events. In
some extreme cases the trace-character is immediately obvious (like in a
fotograph, a fossile or the connectivities in the brain leading to a memory).
Other examples are the click of an electron in a detector or the polarization
of a photon which scattered from some surface. In general, the traces of
even a single event become distributed over a huge number of degrees of
freedom and may in practice never be observed in their totality. But when
we observe reality we mostly look at facts, and classical physics is essentially
a theory about facts. Even though the equations of motion allow to make
predictions about future states of a system, classical physics is not concerned
with the event of “coming into being” itself. Actually, in the framework of all
variants of classical physics (including relativity) this problem cannot even
be addressed. The deterministic character of the equations of motion lead in
an almost automatic way to a block type universe in which everything which
is, was, or will be has the same degree of facticity.
For addressing questions related to the factual aspects of reality, we refer
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to the categorical apparatus mentioned in Sec. 4. The four slots - (1) rela-
tion between physical events, (2) combinations of predications, (3) relation
between observer and observed, (4) ordering structure of time and space - are
filled with the following categories: (1) processes are deterministic (causally
closed), (2) a predicate about a physical attribute is either true or false, (3)
an observation has no influence on the observed, (4) space and time allow for
an ordering structure: events along a world line can be sequentially ordered
and for objects in space there exists a metrical and topological ordering. In
the following sections we shall discuss these categories in more detail.
5.1 The deterministic nature of physical processes
In the context of classical physics, the changes in state space are described
by equations of motion. If the state of a closed physical system is given at a
certain instant t, the equations of motion determine the state for any other
instant t′. This is also true of Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism and of
special and general relativity.1
At this point we should emphasize that we are not so much concerned
with actual predictability but only with determinism. In the framework of
relativity we even can speak of a local determinism, i.e., the state of a system
at point x and time t is determined by the configuration of the state at time
t−∆t (for sufficiently small ∆t, in order to avoid the singularities mentioned
in the footnote of the previous paragraph) within a volume of radius c∆t.
In classical physics we may choose ∆t to be as small as we like (keeping it
positive and non-zero). This local determinism (which is always present in
the absence of an action at a distance) extends to a global determinism (at
least within a finite part of our universe) and is independent of the actual
impossibility to make predictions due to the complexity of a system. For
this reason this notion of determinism extends also to non-linear systems
with chaotic behavior.
1In particular with respect to general relativity we should mention, that certain initial
conditions may lead to singularities in the solutions which make a determination of this
solution of the equations beyond the singularity impossible or even meaningless. Such
singularities indicate a break-down of the classical theory and, thereby, of the classical
categorical apparatus or F-scheme. Effects of quantum gravity may become relevant.
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5.2 The tertium non datur of predications
In physics a predication about a system is a statement about the values of
observables which can be measured for this system. In the following we will
talk about pure states only. Algebraically, a state can be defined as a positive,
normalized, linear functional on the set of observables. These states form a
convex set and pure states are the states on the boundary of this set. On an
operational level a state can be defined by the equivalence class of the history
of the system, where the history includes the preparation process. Two
histories are equivalent, if the corresponding states have identical expectation
values for all observables. For a pure state the history cannot be refined in
such a way that the variances of some observables become smaller without
increasing the variances of other observables.
In classical physics any observable has a well-defined value for a pure state
in the following sense: Each measurement of the same observable F in the
same state ω yields the same result f which is identical to the expectation
value: f = ω(F ). There is no spreading of results, the variance of the results
for a sample of measurements of the same observable is zero. Therefore one
can say, that in this situation the system has the property ‘f ’. (There are
technical problems when f is a continuous variable, in which case one usually
refers to intervals.) In this sense the terium non datur - the exclusion of a
third possibility - holds: for a system in a pure state a predication is either
true or false.
In most cases we actually do observe variances of observables but in the
context of classical physics it is taken for granted that these variances are
either due to a mixture of states, i.e., the systems under consideration are
not prepared in a pure state, or due to an experimental error, i.e., the un-
certainties in the measuring procedure and the limits in the precision of the
measuring instruments lead to a spreading of the data. A pure system is
assumed to have a definite value with respect to any observable.
5.3 The separability of observer and observed
A further assumption which is implicitly made in the context of classical
physics is the separability of observer and observed. In the idealized case
an observation (measurement) has no influence on the observed system. In
other words, the increase of knowledge of the observer about a system does
not lead to a change of state of this system.
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At first sight this assumption seems to contradict Newton’s third law -
“actio” equals “reactio”: the force of system 1 on system 2 equals (in opposite
direction) the force of system 2 on system 1. In a slightly different setting
one can also say that the energy loss of one system is equal to the energy
gain of the other system. Any observation obviously changes the state of the
observing system: the sensor of the measuring device, the transformation to
a change of the pointer of a measuring device up to the change of knowledge
on the side of the observer. Therefore, according to Newton’s third law, this
should be accompanied by a corresponding change in the observed system.
The more rigorous statement of the classical assumption of a separation
between observer and observed is: The influence of the observing system
on the observed system due to the observation (measurement) can be made
arbitrarily small and is independent of the precision of the measurement.
Equivalently, one may say that in classical physics informational flow does
not need a corresponding flow of energy. The changes on the side of the
observing system may be large and accompanied by a macroscopic amount
of energy, however, this energy comes from an amplification mechanism. A
measuring device can be prepared in such a way that an arbitrarily small
change of one component (a detecting device) is amplified in such a way as
to give rise to a macroscopically large change of another component (the
pointer).
The independence of the observer from the observed system should not
be confused with a “God’s-eye” perspective on the side of the observer, even
though these two concepts are closely related. A God’s-eye perspective (in
contrast to an intrinsic perspective) not only assumes that the observation
is done without disturbance of the observed system, but it also assumes a
preferred set of measuring devices (clocks, rulers, etc.) which are not subject
to the standard laws of physics. Most prominent in the realm of classical
physics is the “God’s-eye” perspective in the context of relativity: clocks are
synchronized with respect to a prefered system, the perception of events is
not subject to the delay due to the finite expansion velocity of light, etc.
5.4 Sequential ordering of time
Newtonian mechanics (excluding for a moment Maxwell’s theory or the the-
ory of relativity) assumes a universal time with a universal concept of si-
multaneity: For any two events a and b in the universe one of the following
statements is true: a < b, a > b or a = b, where “<”, “>” and “=” refer to
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“before”, “after” and “simultaneous”, respectively.
In the context of special or general relativity this is no longer true. We
may still define a < b and a > b as “a is in the backward lightcone of b”
or “a is in the future lightcone of b”, but there is no universal notion of
simultaneity. The most one can say from an objective, universal level is
that two events a and b are causally unrelated (i.e., they are in the causal
complement of each other as defined by the future and backward light-cones).
In special relativity the notion of simultaneity is used with respect to a
given inertial system. However, this requires a (to a large extend arbitrary)
synchronization convention for clocks within the same reference system but
at different positions.
What still is true even in relativity is the total sequential ordering of
events along a world-line.2 For any two events on a single world-line the
statements a < b, a > b or a = b are unambiguous. This is a consequence of
the necessary condition for a world-line to be time-like. In this sense, time
is sequential along any world-line. (This statement has to be modified for
light-like world-lines corresponding to particles of zero rest mass; in this case
all events along this world line “happen” simultaneously.)
We should remark that there is a corresponding ordering structure for
space. In Section 4, the fourth slot of our template of categories refered to
the ordering structure of space and time. However, in most cases we will only
talk about the ordering structure of time (the sequentiality of time). The
reason is that the topological ordering structure of space (giving meaning to
“inside” and “outside” with respect to closed 2-spaces etc.) and even more
its metric structure (giving rise to relative distances) is closely related to the
localization of objects. The position of an object is generally considered as
a property and, therefore, can be treated in the context of the terium non
datur. The difference is due to an asymmetry in physics with respect to the
nature of space and time: while we attribute observables to the location or
position of an object, we usually do not introduce a “time-observable”.
2At this point we explicitly exclude non-causal solutions of Einstein’s equations which
allow for closed time-like loops like the Goedel universe.
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6 The categorical apparatus of the statu nascendi
aspect of reality
In the previous section we have briefly summarized the categories (conceptual
assumptions) applied in the context of classical (non-quantum) physics. None
of these categories holds anymore in the context of quantum theory. We now
introduce the corresponding categorical apparatus of quantum theory.
The four slots of our categorical template will be filled with the following
categories:
1. Nature of processes: autogenetic.
2. Combination of predications: paratactic.
3. Relation between the observer and observed: self-referential.
4. Temporal ordering structure: time-space of the present.
At first sight, these concepts may sound unfamiliar, strange, and even un-
definable. However, we will show that essentially all of these concepts are
already contained in the standard mathematical formalism used in quantum
theory. However, we will use these more general terms in order to emphasize
that many of these concepts can also be found outside the realm of quantum
theory. (For a more philosophical account of these concepts see [20] and [23].)
When we refer to quantum physical phenomena, usually all four compo-
nents of the second categorical apparatus apply. However, we see a particular
close relationship between the following concepts of standard quantum theory
with the expressions above:
1. Autogenesis - the non-deterministic state reduction.
2. Parataxis - the superposition principle.
3. Self-referentiality - entanglement.
4. Time-space of the present - the loss of sequentiality for events.
In the following sections we will make these concepts as well as some of the
relations between them more transparent.
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6.1 Autogenesis - The non-determinism in state reduc-
tion
The classical Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory includes two pro-
cesses by which the state of a quantum system can change in time: (1) the de-
terministic evolution of a closed quantum system according to Schro¨dinger’s
equation, and (2) the non-deterministic state reduction of a quantum system
as the result of a measurement.
While the first process of temporal change is largely undisputed, the sec-
ond one is subject of ongoing debates. In particular protagonists of the
many-worlds interpretation (see Everett [6] and deWitt [7]) deny the exis-
tence of an ontic collapse even though they usually ascribe an ontic reality
to the wave function (in contrast to information based interpretations of
quantum theory for which the quantum state itself has only an epistemic
meaning). The fact that we seem to experience a non-deterministic reduc-
tion of the quantum state is explained by a rapid decoherence which makes
it impossible to construct observables which are able to interpolate between
sufficiently different branches of the wave function and, therefore, it becomes
increasingly impossible to observe interferences between these branches.
As mentioned before, we will assume that the reduction of a quantum
state is related to an ontic part of our reality. Presumably this is the strongest
assumption about the interpretation of quantum theory which we make in
this context. According to this assumption, quantum theory is intrinsically
non-deterministic. This non-determinism is not the consequence of a lack of
knowledge, and in this sense Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason is violated
in quantum theory.
The relation of the non-determinism of quantum theory with the “status
nascendi” of quantum theory becomes obvious when we notice that it is
exactly the reduction process which marks the transition from possibilities
to facts. The reduction process corresponds to a genuine event and the results
of this event are the facts which we ultimately observe.
Why did we name this category “autogenesis”? In its original meaning,
autogenesis means “self generation”. By using this expression we want to
emphasize that the results of certain processes are not predetermined by any
external or internal cause. In the reduction process, one of several possibil-
ities becomes a fact and there is no cause whatsoever, which among these
possibilities will be realised. We should emphasize that “autogenesis” also
excludes any internal cause in the sense of hidden variables within the sys-
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tem. It is the event itself, not some predetermined structure inside or outside
the system, which leads to a particular outcome.
6.2 Parataxis - The Superposition Principle
The second slot of our categorical template refers to predications about phys-
ical attributes and, in particular, how these predications may be combined.
As we have mentioned before, in the F-scheme predications follow the stan-
dard form of binary “either-or” logic (true or false). Formally, this corre-
sponds to a boolean lattice. Now we argue that in the second apparatus,
the E-scheme, even contradicting predications can stand side by side in the
form of “as well as”. We will refer to this property of the predication space
as “parataxis”, and its realization in quantum theory is the superposition
principle. In the context of a predication calculus, this catergory may be
realized by non-boolean lattices (see, e.g., [16]).
The concept of superpositions is most easily formulated when quantum
states are expressed as (normalized) vectors in a Hilbert space. Often it is
stated in the form that with any two vectors |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 also the (normal-
ized) linear combination
|ψ〉 = α|ψ1〉+ β|ψ2〉 with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 (1)
is a quantum state.3 Another formulation of the same principle is that a
state |ψ〉 can be expanded in terms of the eigenstates |ψi〉 of any self-adjoint
observable A:
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
αi|ψi〉 with
∑
i
|αi|2 = 1 , (2)
where
A|ψi〉 = ai|ψi〉 . (3)
In this formulation the superposition principle seems to depend on the
representation of pure quantum states as vectors of a Hilbert space. How-
ever, strictly speaking, pure quantum states rather correspond to the one-
dimensional rays in a Hilbert space, or, in other representations, to the set
of one-dimensional projection operators on a Hilbert space or to the (con-
vex) boundary of the set of normalized, positive density matrices. For these
3Superselection rules may put restrictions onto this rule but this shall not concern us
here.
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objects one cannot define a unique addition. (The normalized addition of
projection operators or density matrices leads to mixed states while the su-
perposition of pure states is again a pure state.)
A word concerning our notation: ψ often refers to a quantum state in-
dependent of its mathematical representation. If we want to emphasize that
the state is a positive, normalized, linear functional on the set of observables,
we write ωψ, and ωψ(A) denotes the expectation value of the observable A
in this state. When ψ is represented by a normalized vector, we write |ψ〉,
and the expectation value of the observable A is
ωψ(A) = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 . (4)
Finally, if we represent the state by a projection operator onto the ray defined
by the vector |ψ〉, we write Pψ, and the expectation value of an observable
A is
ωψ(A) = tr(PψA) . (5)
The superposition principle of quantum theory expresses a property which
is independent of the representation of pure states. We define a state ω to
be dispersion-free with respect to an observable A, if
ω(A2) = ω(A)2 . (6)
When this property holds, a measurement of A always yields the same result
a = ω(A). In the F-scheme of classical physics any pure state is dispersion-
free with respect to any observable.
If a vector can be expanded according to eq. (2), the corresponding state
is not dispersion-free with respect to the operator A, unless all the expansion
coefficients αi are zero except one coefficiet (which is one), in which case |ψ〉
is itself an eigenstate of A. More general, let
A =
∑
i
aiPi (7)
be the spectral decomposition of the observable A, then
ω(A) =
∑
i
aiω(Pi) (8)
and
ω(Pi) = |αi|2 . (9)
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These values can be obtained from a distribution measurement of {ai}. The
relative phases between these coefficients require measurements of comple-
mentary observables (observables which do not commute with A). In quan-
tum mechanics it is impossible to construct pure states which are dispersion-
free with respect to all observables [24].
Let ψ be a state which is not dispersion-free with respect to an observable
A. In this case, the same measurement (of observable A) performed on the
same state ψ may sometimes yield the result a1 and sometimes a different
result a2, where a1 and a2 are eigenvalues of A. (For simplicity, we consider
only two possible outcomes.) In this case, we can neither say that the state
has the property a1, nor that is does not have this property. In this sense the
tertium non datur does not hold. Some scientist prefer to say that this state
ψ is not compatible with properties related to the observable A, others will
say that it has property a1 “as well as” property a2. Fact is that measure-
ments of observable A for the same state ψ sometimes yield the result a1 and
sometimes the result a2, and in this sense both properties can be attributed
to the state ψ.
Parataxis is an expression which is used in philosophy to denote that
predications “stand side by side” and that the tertium on datur does not
hold. It is also used in the science of literatur where it refers to a text
in which a situation, phenomenon or object is described by a collection of
(sometimes even contradictory) attributes. Apart from the violation of the
tertium non datur two more properties characterize paratactic predication:
1. The overall meaning of a paractic predication unfolds itself out of the
constellations of components. This is reflected in the mathematical
formalism by the fact that the transition amplitudes αi = 〈ψi|ψ〉 be-
tween the state ψ and the states ψi, which correspond to the paratactic
predicates {ai}, determine ψ uniquely.
2. Formal conclusions are not possible and thus the ex falso quot libet
catastrophy (from one contradiction one can derive any statement) is
avoided. Almost symbolic for this aspect in quantum theory is the
famous citation of Richard Feynman referring to the double slit ex-
periment: “... [The electron] always is going through one hole or the
other - when you look. But when you have no apparatus to determine
through which hole the thing goes, then you cannot say that it either
goes through one hole or the other. (You can always say it - provided
20
you stop thinking immediately and make no deductions from it. Physi-
cists prefer not to say it, rather than to stop thinking at the moment.)
To conclude that it goes either through one hole or the other when you
are not looking is to produce an error in prediction. ...” ([25] p.144).
Given the absence of formal truth criteria, actual experience is the only
way to verify a proposition.
As we have seen, in classical physics either a or ¬a is true, but in quantum
theory a as well as ¬a may be true in the sense, that we find states |ψ〉 which
are a linear superposition of an eigenstate |ψa〉 with the (dispersion-free)
property a and an eigenstate |ψ¬a〉 with the (dispersion-free) property ¬a:
|ψ〉 = α|ψa〉+ β|ψ¬a〉 with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 . (10)
This property of quantum states is what we will denote by “paratactic”, and
α and β are manifestations of the relative constellation of the components.
6.3 Self-Referentiality - the nonseparability of observer
and observed
One of the most significant and in it’s consequences most dramatic features
of quantum theory is the phenomenon of entanglement. It has to be kept
in mind, however, that entanglement can only be defined with respect to a
tensor product representation of a Hilbert space H:
H = H1 ⊗H2 . (11)
A state |Ψ〉 (represented by a normalized vector) in H is called separable if
it can be written in the form
|Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉 , (12)
where |ψ〉 ∈ H1 and |ϕ〉 ∈ H2. A state which is not separable is called
entangled (with respect to the tensor product representation).
Typical entangled states are EPR-states
|ΦEPR〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ1〉 ⊗ |ϕ2〉 − |ψ2〉 ⊗ |ϕ1〉) , (13)
or, more general, Bell states:
|ΦBell〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ1〉 ⊗ |ϕ2〉 ± |ψ2〉 ⊗ |ϕ1〉) (14)
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and
|Φ′Bell〉 =
1√
2
(|ψ1〉 ⊗ |ϕ2〉 ± |ψ2〉 ⊗ |ϕ1〉) . (15)
With respect to measures of entanglement these states are maximally entan-
gled.
In a similar way entanglement can also be defined for higher tensor prod-
uct representations of the state space. For these higher order tensor products
one can even define different types of entanglement. A famous example are
the GHZ-states for three particle systems [26].
In the context of quantum theory, the tensor product representation is
interpreted as a splitting or a partition of the system described by H into two
subsystems which are described by H1 and H2, respectively. In many cases,
such a partition seems natural, e.g., when the total system consists of two
particles and the subsystems refer to the single particles. In other cases such a
splitting may appear arbitrary, e.g., when the description of a single particle
is split with respect to the coordinates of its reference system. Another,
more relevant, example is a single particle for which the total state space is
splitted with respect to the spatial degrees of freedom on the one hand and
the spinorial degrees of freedom on the other hand. For an electron which
passed a Stern-Gerlach magnet one may speak of an entanglement between
the spatial position of this electron and its spin orientation:
Ψ(x, s) =
1√
2
(
ψ+(x)⊗ |s = +〉+ ψ−(x)⊗ |s = −〉) . (16)
ψ±(x) are parts of the spatial wave function which are peaked around differ-
ent positions.
The weird aspects of entanglement enter when the system described by
the quantum state is non-local, e.g., when the system consists of two particles
which are far apart. A measurement performed at one particle has imme-
diate consequences for the state of the other particle. To be more precise,
a measurement performed at one particle leads to a reduction of the total
state in such a way that the state becomes separable, which in turn makes
it possible to assign a definite state to the second particle. According to the
standard formalism of quantum theory, this state reduction occurs instanta-
neously. As the resulting correlations do not allow to transmit information
or energy, this process does not violate the causality principle of the theory
of relativity. Nevertheless, Einstein called this “superluminal” change of the
state due to the reduction process a “spooky action at a distance”. (It should
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be mentioned that this “spooky action at a distance” not only occurs for en-
tangled systems but also for single particle states with a highly non-local
wave function.)
In principle, any interaction between two particles - or, more generally,
between two systems - leads to entanglement. (On the other hand, sub-
sequent interactions with other systems may destroy these entanglements.)
Up to now, we mostly considered the interaction between particles or typical
quantum systems. However, according to the standard formalism of quantum
theory, this statement remains true for macroscopic systems. A particular
case is the situation of a measurement, where a quantum system (a system
with few degrees of freedom) interacts with a classical system (a system with
many degrees of freedom). In quantum theory the measurement process has
to be considered as an interaction which has an influence on both systems,
the observing as well as the observed system. As a result of this interaction
the observed system and the observing system become entangled. We briefly
recall this situation in the usual framework.
Let
|s〉 =
∑
i
αi|si〉 (17)
be the state of a quantum system, expressed as a superposition of eigenstates
with respect to the measured observable. (We are not addressing the “pointer
basis problem” here, see e.g. [27], so we assume that these states are uniquely
given.) Let |ϕ0〉 be the initial state of the measuring device, and {|ϕi〉} be
its pointer basis. The initial state of the combined system |Φ0〉 is separable:
|Φ0〉 = |s〉|ϕ0〉 =
∑
i
αi|si〉|ϕ0〉 . (18)
The interaction between the two systems due to the measuring process leads
to a superposition of correlated states:
|Φ1〉 =
∑
i
αi|si〉|ϕi〉 . (19)
This state is an entangled state. The observing system and the observed
system are no longer separated. It is impossible to assign a separate quantum
state to any of these two systems, and only the quantum state corresponding
to the combined system is meaningful. In a next step the reduction process
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describes the transition from the superposition of possibilities as expressed
in eq. (19) to a single fact:
|Φ1〉 −→ |Φ2〉 = |sk〉|ϕk〉 . (20)
Hence, the process of observation first leads to entanglement and, there-
fore, an inseparability between observer and observed. In a second step
the reduction process results in physical facts. Obviously also the other
two concepts discussed so far play an essential role: the paratactic predica-
tion (expressed in the superposition of possibilities) and the intrinsic non-
determinism of the reduction.
We have attributed the loss of dichotomy between observer and observed
to the general concept of self-referentiality. The philosophical reasons for
this attribution will be discussed elsewhere [23]. However, it should be ob-
vious that when observer and observed are no longer separated, we have
the situation that “a system observes itself”, which is a strong form of self-
referentiality.
6.4 The non-sequentiality of time
The final slot of the categorical template refers to the ordering structures
of space and time. As we have mentioned before, the loss of the relational
metrical ordering in space (as defined, e.g., by relative distances) as well
as the topological ordering (e.g., the notion of “inside” and “outside” with
respect to closed 2-surfaces) is already obvious for systems with spatially
extended wave functions. It can be associated with a loss of “either-or”
predications with respect to the position. Therefore, we will concentrate in
this section on the partial loss of the predominant ordering principle of time
- the sequentiallity of events along a world line - in quantum theory. Of
course, this loss of sequentiality is restricted to typical quantum phenomena,
i.e. in most cases to very short time intervals. Only in special cases are the
relevant time intervals of macroscopic extension.
We first have to specify what is meant by “loss of sequential ordering”.
In quantum theory, time is treated as a classical 1-parameter variable which,
of course, allows for a well-defined ordering. This variable refers to a math-
ematical time and it is realized by a classical clock (we will say more about
this point later). However, as we have described in Sec. 5, the sequentiality
of time in the F-scheme refers to the sequentiality of events along world-lines:
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for any two events a and b on a world-line one can say “a before b” or “b
before b”. It is this property which is partially lost in quantum theory.
Let us consider the quantum propagator of a system, i.e., the probability
amplitude K(x, y, t), where x is the initial state of the system, y the final
state, and t the propagation time (as measured by a classical clock). Here x
and y may represent the position of a single particle, the collective positions
of many particles, the configuration of a field etc. According to Feynman’s
representation of this propagator as a sum over histories we may write:
K(x, y, t) =
∑
x→y
exp
(
i
~
S[x→ y; t]
)
. (21)
“x→ y” represents a possible history of how the system can evolve from state
x to state y within the time interval t (which is the same for all histories);
S[x → y, t] is the classical action for this history, and ∑x→y symbolizes the
summation over all such histories. If these histories involve certain events
a1, a2, ... , and if the general constraints on the set of histories do not
forbid a permutation of the temporal order (with respect to the mathematical
background time t) of these events, then the summation over histories implies
also a summation over all these permutations. In such a case, when a system
has propagated from state x to y, it is meaningless to state that a certain
event a1 happened before a second event a2 or vice versa. The classical
sequentiality of events along the world line of the system is lost.
The loss of sequentiality as it follows from the summation over histo-
ries representation is most obvious in elementary particle physics, where the
amplitudes for scattering processes are expressed in terms of Feynman di-
gramms. This representation includes a summation over all possible types
of events as well as an integration over all possible space-time locations of
these events. In this form not only the loss of sequentiality is obvious, but
also the loss of determinism, the paratactic predication (all possible processes
actually contribute) and even the self-referentiality in the sense of a highly
interactive and entangled system.
Two objections may come into mind at this point: (1) In the examples
given above one cannot even say that a certain event has happened, therefore,
the loss of temporal sequentiality may rather be due to a loss of facticity. (2)
Is the loss of temporal sequentiality not an immediate consequence of the
energy-time uncertainty relation in quantum theory? Both issues shall be
addressed now.
25
(1) Let us consider an example where it is known that two different events
a and b have happened, but where the temporal order of these events is open.
Imagine two different (distinguishable) atoms A and B in a small box. Both
atoms shall be in an exited state, and the transition energy from the excited
state to the ground state shall be equal in both cases. We will observe
two photons of the same energy emerging from the box, possibly with a
large temporal delay between the first and second event. However, without
disturbing the system by an additional observation, we cannot tell which of
the two observed photons corresponds to the decay of which atom. In fact,
in the summation over histories we have to sum over both possibilities (atom
A decaying first and B second and vice versa), and again the temporal order
of these events (which are now known to have happened) is not defined. This
situation resembles the spatial non-separability in the double slit experiment:
It is known that a particle has passed through a double slit but there is no
information about which of the two slits it has passed through.
(2) The uncertainty relation between time and energy, ∆t · ∆E ≥ ~/2,
refers to a limitation in the precision of measurements of these two quanti-
ties on the same system: ∆E is the uncertainty in an energy measurement
during a time interval ∆t, or, vice versa, ∆t is the maximal precission for the
determination of the moment of an event in which an energy is transfered
of which the value can be known up to ∆E. The example given above (the
decay of two atoms) involves the energy of the emitted photons. For each
single atom the uncertainty of the energy of the emitted photon is related
to the precision with which the moment of the decay can be determined. If
both decays happen within these time ranges, the loss of sequentiality can be
attributed to the uncertainty relation between time and energy. (For similar
examples related to the loss of sequentiality see, e.g., [28, 29, 30].)
However, concerning the sequentiality of the two decays, what is relevant
is the indistinguishability of the emitted photons. If the photons have the
same energy, it is impossible to attribute one of the photons to one of the
events and the sequence of events cannot be determined. If, however, for
some reason, atom A only emitts photons with a left circular polarisation and
atom B only emitts photons with a right circular polarisation, the association
of an emitted photon to a certain event a or b would be possible and the
sequentializability indeed only depends on the precision of how exact the
moments of emission can be measured, which again would be subject to the
energy-time uncertainty relation. The two cases - polarized or unpolarized
photons - involve the same energies, however, the loss of sequentiality only
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refers to the unpolarized case.
7 The time-space of the present
In the previous section we described the loss of sequentiality of events within
certain time limits. In this section we will draw some conclusions from this
observation and, in particular, emphasize that the quantum mechanical for-
malism gives strong indications that a complete unified theory of space and
time on the one side with the principles of quantum theory on the other side
may not be possible without a theory of the present.
The paratactic predication with respect to the location of objects together
with the loss of temporal sequentiality of events make it difficult if not im-
possible to obtain a “block universe” picture of reality. By “block universe”
we mean a well-defined and fixed space-time representation of the universe.
(Famous is the description of a block universe by Sir Arthur Eddington:
“Events don’t happen; events are simply there” [31].) The fact that the lo-
cations of particles and the sequentiality of events are not determined within
certain limits leaves “bubbles” in a block universe description for which, due
to the inherent inseparability, a higher resolution description is not possible.
Similar bubbles occur also in the “consistent histories” descriptions of quan-
tum theory [32, 33] where it becomes obvious that a refinement of the set of
possible histories to one single history describing the facts in our universe is
impossible.
Of course, such bubbles only remain when one tries to represent the his-
tories in terms of classicle particle trajectories. If, instead, one considers the
wave function (or, equivalently, the quantum state) as the essential entity,
a block universe representation is possible, but due to the indeterminacy
of quantum theory and the reduction process, certain branches of the wave
function may come to an end while other branches become enhanced. In both
cases a prediction of the future state of the universe in terms of a present
state is impossible. Within the many-worlds interpretation of Everett [6, 7]
this problem is circumvented, because there is no collapse of the quantum
state and the block universe representation in terms of quantum states is
deterministic.
However, one problem remains for all of these representations. The stan-
dard formalism of quantum theory seems to indicate the existence of a pref-
ered simultaneity - quantum theory is non-local. Consider an EPR-state
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where the two entangled particles are far apart. A measurement on one of
the particles leads to an instantaneous non-local reduction of the quantum
state (in the many-worlds representation, the wave function splits non-locally
into two branches). If we assign an objective (ontic) meaning to a quantum
state, this non-local reduction would be a non-local event which distinguishes
a prefered simultaneity at two distant locations. One could even imagine
an entangled state consisting of many particles densely distributed over the
whole universe,
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+,+,+,+, ...〉+ |−,−,−,−, ...〉) , (22)
where “+” and “−” refers to some spin orientation of the single particles. A
measurement of one particle leads to the reduction of the state of all particles
and, therefore, to a global notion of simultaneity.
Among the standard interpretations of quantum theory, only a subjective
interpretation of the quantum state - describing just the information we have
about a system - circumvents this problem, because in this interpretation the
reduction of the quantum state has no observer independent ontic correlate.4
Our formalism circumvents the problems associated with non-local reduc-
tion processes. The locality requirement and the causal structure of relativity
refer to the factual aspects of reality. When a measurement is made on one
of the particles, this becomes a fact in the vicinity of this particle. Even
though the state is reduced simultaneously for the second particle, as long
as no measurement is made at the second particle, this reduction is not fac-
tual in the vicinity of this particle. (Of course, what is relevant here is not
the measurement as an experimental situation, but the question whether the
second particle has sufficient interaction with its environment in order to
transfer the information about the reduced state to its environment; in this
case this information would become factual.) On the other hand, if a mea-
surement is made at the second particle, the result coincides with the first
measurement. However, as the experimenter has no influence on the result
of the measurement, it is impossible to transfer a signal using the reduction
process.
4In the GRW-formalism [10] a Lorentz-invariant reduction process has been developed.
However, many of the concepts employed in this approach - a multi-time formalism, non-
local correlations in the location of reduction points, and a stochastic (non-deterministic)
extension of the Schro¨dinger equation - indicate a close relationship to our E-scheme
categories.
28
Quantum theory gives us at least two indications that for a full under-
standing a theory of the present might be necessary: (1) the non-deterministic
reduction process describes the transition from potentialities to facts, which
is exactly what one would expect to occur in a present, (2) the non-local
simultaneity distinguishes a global space-like hyperspace where reduction
processes occur simultaneously, and this would be a prerequisite for an ontic
(global) “present”. It has been argued at several occasions that a theory of
the present contradicts special and general relativity. Einstein himself, in a
discussion with R. Carnape, was disappointed that the theory of relativtiy
does not allow for a theory of the present [34], and a famous argument in this
discussion is due to K. Goedel [35]. (For Goedel it was not the Minkowski
space itself which contradicted a theory of a present, because a distinguished
space-like hyperspace is at least possible, but due to the theoretical exis-
tence of solutions of Einstein’s equations with light-like closed loops - as, for
instance, in the Goedel universe - he considered a theory of the present as
impossible.)
We want to indicate now some of the ingrediants of such a theory of
the present. In accordance with the previous section, the present has an
extension. This extension is attributed to events, it depends on the process
(i.e., it is not the same for all processes), and it is measured against an
external clock. These statements need a clarification which will be given
now.
The extension of the present is indicated by the transition from virtual
possibilities to facts. This transition is not sharp. Due to certain properties,
a particle may interact with its environment and, thereby, transfers the in-
formation about these properties to environmental degrees of freedom which
now, due to their interaction with ever more degrees of freedom, spread this
information to an increasing number of other particles or systems. By this
process, events become facts. Facticity is not an either-or property, but it
increases gradually. It is closely related to the concept of decoherence. A
(qualitative) measure of facticity would be the effort to “undo” a certain
event, i.e., to restore all the coherence necessary in order to generate inter-
ference effects which indicate that a certain event did not happen. (It has
been estimated [33] that in order to “undo” n degrees of freedom which took
part in decoherence, a system of the order of exp(an3/2) degrees of freedom
is necessary, where a is some positive constant; this indicates a possibility
to quantify such a measure.) Therefore, facticity is never absolute but only
FAPP (“for all practical purposes”, an expression introduced by J. Bell in a
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similar context [36]).
In some processes the extension of the present is very short (less than
nano-seconds), like, e.g., when a particle his a screen where it is registered.
Under special experimental conditions, one can prolong the process of factual-
ization almost arbitrarily long (e.g. in so-called quantum eraser set-ups [37]).
An extreme example would be the scenario of the cosmic delayed choice ex-
periment which is attributed to Wheeler[38]. Depending on the experimental
set-up on earth one can decide to measure whether a photon emitted from
a quasar several billion years ago passed by a gravitational lense on both
sides (in a double-slit manner) or on one side. Concerning the history of this
photon the present extends over billions of years.
Even within a single process, the extension of the present attributed to
different events may differ. One can rapidly measure the energy of an electron
in an electric field without determining its spin orientation. For atoms one
can measure the absolute values of the magnetic moments in an electric
field without determining their sign. Therefore, facticity (and hence also the
extension of a present) has to be attributed to events and not to systems.
By an external clock (against which we measure the extension of the
present) we mean a system for which the time intervals of the transitions
to facticity are extremely short. Today, atomic clocks or fountain clocks
can resolve time intervals which are much shorter than the “extension of
the present” for many of the systems mentioned above. Presumably there is
a principal lower bound for the resolution of such “external clocks” (which
might be the Planck scale of roughly 10−44 s), which would be a lower bound
for the extension of the present of any event.
We thus arrive at the following picture (see Fig. 1): For each event there is
a measure of facticity whose derivative (with respect to the external “class-
cial” time) gives rise to a measure for the intensitiy of the present of this
event. Entanglement leads to a correlation of such curves for different pro-
cesses and at different locations thus giving rise in a classical limit to a
globalized meaning of the present. On the level of quantum processes, this
meaning is never absolutely precise.
8 Summary and conclusion
In this arcticle we hoped to achieve two goals: (1) We have clarified the
conceptual foundations of quantum theory and put them in opposition to
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Figure 1: (left) Facticity (as measured by the effort to undo an event, see
text) against an idealized external time. (right) The derivative of facticity
yields a measure for the intensity of the present. The time t refers to an
external classical clock.
the conceptual foundations of classical physics. (2) We have outlined certain
aspects of a “theory of the present”, which in our opinion is inherently already
present in the existing formalism of quantum theory.
The E-scheme of the conceptual foundations of quantum theory is comple-
mentary to the F-scheme of the conceptual foundations of classical physics.
Together they constitute the conceptual framework which is necessary to
make statements about reality. In the present article we have elaborated
the E-scheme only in the context of quantum theory. However, to a certain
degree the E-scheme is also relevant for other areas of science. The ingredi-
ents - non-determinism, self-referentiality, non-separability between observer
and observed, etc. - can also be found in other (complex) systems. In [18]
we have argued that both schemes are relevant in addressing the problem
of conciousness. In other areas - e.g. in certain evolutionary processes or
in addressing the question of “What is life?” - it may also turn out to be
relevant that both families of concepts are taken into account.
The concept of a “time-space of the present” which we developed in the
last part of this article, should indicate a new approach towards a theory of
the present. We believe that an understanding of the fundamental concepts
of nature forces us to develope such a theory, and quantum theory already
gives us strong hints towards a non-subjective existence of the present. Next
to consciousness, the present is one of our most intensive experiences, and
without a theory of both we will always lack an understanding of the most
profound basis of reality.
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